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SAN'rA. PE Tl~A!\SPOH'l'A'l'JON COMPANY (a Corporation), Hcspondent, v. STA'l'E BOAHD OF' EQUAI.JTZAT I OX, Appellant.
[1] Automobile Stages- Licenses- Activities Taxable- Exemptions.···Und(•r Hev. & Tax. Code, § 9653 (part of 11otor Vehidc Transportation License Tax Law), deelnring that the tax
does not npply where the transportation of property is wholly
within or between incorporated eitiPs "wlH•re no portion of
the pub lie high way outside the eorporate limits of the eitics
or private property is traversed in such operation," it was
the legislative intent that the exemption should apply only
where entirely intracity operations were concerned, and the
intracity pickup and delivery operations of a railroad subsidiary, conducting both a highway carrier business and a city
earrier business, were not exempt from the gross receipts tax
imposed by the statute where its intracity pickup and delivery
service was so intermingled with as to he an inseparable part
of its intercity scrvrce.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. \Yalter II. Odemar, Judge. Heversed.
Action by highway common carrier to recover taxes paid
under protest. ,Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, James E. Sabine,
Assistant Attorney General, Dan Kaufmann, James C. Maupin and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Appellant.
Robert \V. \Yalker and Robert B. Curtiss for Hespondent.
CAR/l'ER, ,I.-Plaintiff, Santa Fe Transportation Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, or the
transportation company, brought this action against the State
Board of Equalization for a refund of taxes paid under protest.1
See Cal.Jur.2d, Motor Transportation, § 49 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Automobile Stages, § 2.
1
The tax assessed encompassed the periorl from N ovemher 1, 1950
until October 31, 1953. Defendant refundell to plaintiff a penalty

customer's warehouse
of such
and
the customer's ware~
house or
of business to sm h local
of
on bills of lading of the
company which were
either theretofore or thereafter
the
under the same bills of
of the
company from
one station to another over public highways outside the corporate limits of cities. The railroad bills of lading required
the railroad to make pickups and to deliver the
from
the point of origin to the
of destination.
Plaintiff's pickup and
services were, for the most
part, accomplished by the use of
equipment than the
"line haul"
which, for the most part,
used heavier equipment. It is conceded
the plaintiff that
in 8.8 per cent of the operations line haul equipment was
used for pickup and
services whereas in 91.2 per cent
of the operations the line haul equipment was used in the
intercity operations. In some instances the lighter equipment was used in
operations.
The tax here disputed was assessed by defendant Board
of Equalization under the provisions of the California Motor
Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law (Hev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 9601-9607, 9651, 9652 et seq.).
Section
subdivision
, defines "operator" as ".Any
person engaging in the transportation of persons or property
for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any
public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly."
Section 9606 defines ''Gross
'' as follows: '' 'Gross
receipts' inclnde all
from the operation of motor
vehicles entirely within this State and a proportion, based
npon the proportion of the mileage within this State to the
assessed by it and paid by plaintiff, and it has been stipulated between
the parties that the correct amount to which plaintiff would be en·
titled is the sum of $33,244.38 which includes $4,958.07 interest.
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that: ''For the purpose of the proper
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that the gross
f1·om aU
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of operators are
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Section 9651
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tax is hereby imupon operators at the rate of 3 per cent of the gross
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aml
serviee
wa,; an
There is no
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2
This section wns mucnrled in 1!155 l>y the a<J,lition of another paragraph \Yhidt will he hercinnftcr discussed.
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kept by an employee of the railway company and were segregated as to pickup and delivery service and line haul operations. There was no segregation when line haul equipment
was used for pickup and delivery service and no segregation
when the lighter equipment was used for intercity service.
The price charged for pickup and delivery service was 25%
cents per 100 pounds, while the line haul charge was on a
cost plus percentage basis. 'fhe drivers of the line haul equipment and pickup and delivery service equipment were members of different unions, however, as heretofore noted, both
types of equipment V>ere operated to some extent on an interchangeable basis. All equipment was serviced at the same
garage. In some 21 cities, pickup and delivery service was
accomplished by equipment other than that owned by the
transportation company. Plaintiff transportation company
held a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
Public Utilities Commission which authorized it to do both
an intercity and an intracity business and which authorized
it to move on billing of the railway company at its published
tariff rates. Plaintiff was also separately licensed as a city
carrier.
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Califo1·nia ·Motor etc. Co. v.
State Board of Eq~talization (1947), 31 Cal.2d 217 [187 P.2d
7 45], in support of its position that its intracity pickup and
delivery service was a separate and untaxable part of its
business. Defendant board relies on the case of Bekins Van
Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1942), 21 Cal.2d 135 [130 P.2d 421],
in support of its position that the intracity pickup and delivery service was an inseparable and taxable part of plaintiff's intercity operations.
In the California Motor case it was held that the intercity
and intracity operations of the plaintiff were so entirely
separate and distinct as to constitute two separate businesses.
In the California Motor case the plaintiff was a highway
common carrier which operated under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity restricted to intercity operations
and which prohibited it from operating any intracity pickup
and delivery service in any of the three cities which were part
of its intercity operations. Plaintiff purchased the equipment
of the pickup and delivery service in Los Angeles which had
formerly been nsPd by it for its intracity service; it also purchased the equipment of tlJC Oakland and San Francisco pickup and delivery service. Plaintiff, after acquiring a license
as a city carrier, operated the I~os Angeles and Oakland
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and delivery
and the former owner of the
raneisl:o pickup and delivery service continued to operate it for the plaintiff. Plaintiff operated its pickup and delivery services under written contracts with the express company which covered only that portion of the goods transported
in intracity movement. There were also separate written contracts covering the intercity and interterminal transportation.
It was found by the trial court that different equipment was
used for the inter- and intracity services; that '' 'its equipment never deviated from its devotion to the service for which
it was licensed. It kept accounts restricted to its character
as a highway carrier. . .. That plaintiff is both a highway
carrier and a city carrier and it exists in each of these characters by separate authority. Each business [of plaintiff] has
a separate license or certificate. . . . The businesses were not
confused or entangled and did not overlap. The Court finds
that the two operations, that of a city carrier and that of a
highway carrier, are just as separate and distinct for all purposes of this case as if the two operations had been conducted
by separate and distinct corporations or legal entities.' '' It
was also there found that " 'plaintiff has at all times kept
separate and distinct books and records covering said pickup
and delivery service and entirely independent of books and
records covering its intercity operations.' ''
In the Bekins Van case (which was decided in 1942 but
which involved taxes assessed for the years 1935 and 1936
under the provisions of the California :Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Act), it was held that intracity pickup
and delivery service which was maintained for the transportation of small consignments to and from intercity terminals
was taxable as part of the gross receipts. 'rhis court then
stated that : ''The trial court in the present case properly
eoncluded that receipts from all hauls which originated in one
city for transportation over the public highways or which
terminated in a city after such transportation should be
treated without distinction as taxable gross receipts from operation.
"It is shown that receipts from intra-city business as excepted from the act were not included in the computations
of gross receiptr.; from operation as defined by the act. Nor
were charges for labor furnished for the purpose of packing
and crating goods, or warehousing, included in the gross
receipts subject to ta:s:ation. All exceptions and limitations
provided by the act were contemplated in the additional assess-
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was used
haul~;.

of this eourt dis<·
that the assessments upon the
plaintiff
UJ>Oll the
21 CaL2d
'
The situation in that casr, howeyer,
docs
not coincide with that now before us. There was not proven
and found by the court, as
that the plaintiff conducted
two separate and distinct business operations, each of which
performed distinct and different services nuder contracts
separately executed <with the
of the services. Hather,
the plaintiff there argued that before the tax rate was applied,
it was entitled to dednct from its gross
for the hauling
of goods from its customers' dwellings in one
to those in
other cities an amount computed as attributable to services
rendered in loading and unloading such
between house
and sidewalk, as well as amounts '
indicatecl on ·its
waybills receivul
and
within
' In its opinion this court
139
of 21 Cal.2d), 'In intercity hauls of smali
the
plaintiff found it more convenient to
up and deliver with
the use of smaller trucks between the point of pick-up or
delivery and the larger truck or van which was to transport
or wl1ieh had transported the
over the public highways.
In other
hauls, the van or truck received and discha1·gccl the load directly at the door. The plaintiff contends
that
from such separate pickup and
service
within municipalities in connection with intercity hauls should
be excepted from assessnwnt under the act beeause that service
is conducted entirely within municipalities and does not employ any
of the public higlnvays.' . . .
"It is to be noted, also, that the court in its opinion in the
above-cited case points out
142 of 21 Cal.2d) that 'receipts
from intra-city businesR as
from tile act [Hev. & Tax.
Code, § 9653] 1vere not included [by the Board of Equalization] in the computation of gross receipts from operation as
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defined by the act. Nor were charges for labor furnished for
the purpose of packing and crating goods, or ·warehousing,
included in the gross receipts subject to taxation,' and that
138) in its return to the board for the years in question
'the plaintiff reported its gross receipts from all transportation business in the state exclusive of hauls excepted
section
14
§
of the act,' but claimed deductions therefrom
as described aboYe. It thus appears that only receipts
those scr·viccs which were found to be ·integral parts of the
of
goods from a dwelling, over the
destirwtion ontsidc of the city in
originated, were held subject to
the tax. By
plaintiff in the instant case is not moving
the goods of its own customers in intercity operations whereof
the pickup and delivery service forms an integral part of a
unitary operation, but is rather, as found by the trial court,
engaging in two separate and distinct businesses, severally
authorized by a certificate of public convenience and necessity and by a permit to operate as a city carrier, in which it
renders to an express company, which alone deals with the
general public, separate services under separate contracts and
with separate and independent bills rendered therefor. Manifestly, the fact that the same goods were the subjects of both
intracity and intercity transportation does not establish that
as a matter ol' law there was but a single business operation.
In truth, the plaintiff in its capaeity of highway carrier was,
as previously noted, prohibited from rendering pickup and
delivery service in any of its terminal depot eities and, hence,
could carry intercity only the identical goods which were the
subject of pickup and deliYery by some other operation or
agency." (Emphasis added.)
A comparison of the facts of the case at bar with the distinctions above drawn shows: That plaintiff carried goods for its
parent company, the railway company, on the railway's bills
of lading; that while plaintiff had two certificates, one of which
was an intracity license, its certificate of public convenience
and necessity was not prohibitory but im~luded the right to
c·onduet intr~wity transportation; that piekup and delivery
t-Jerviee and intercity operations were rendered under separate
c:ontracts although it appear:-; that tbe original 1937 contract
covered intrac-.ity pidmps and deliveriPs as well as line hauls;
that while no separate hills were rendered for the two services,
different ehargec; were made for intra- and intereity operations; that pickup and delivery charges were registered by the
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railway
and forwarded to the plaintiff which kept
monthly summaries and payment was remitted monthly by the
agents; that while bookkeeping was segregated on the basis of
pickup and delivery and line haul operations, there was some
intermingling and overlapping both as to the bookkeeping and
the operations themselves in that no distinction was made as to
wholly intracity pickups and deliveries.
In the Bekins case it was held to be of no significance that
plaintiff there used smaller equipment for pickup and delivery as a matter of its owu convenience. In the California
Motor case it was held to be of great significance that there
was no overlapping or intermingling of the use of the two
types of vehicles and that there was separate billing and a
complete separation of the intra- and intercity accounts as
a matter of bookkeeping. It was also held significant in the
California Motor case that while the pickup and delivery services were owned by the intercity transportation company, both
businesses were conducted on behalf of an independent third
party-the express company. Factually, the case at bar appears more like the Bekins case than it does the California
Motor case. The Bekins case was not overruled by the California Motor case but was distinguished only because of the
factual differences existing in the two cases.
[1] Plaintiff argues that there is nothing in section 9653
to indieate a legislative intention that a transportation operation was exempt from taxation only if it is entirely separated from or in no way related to another transportation
which is conducted on high·ways outside the city limits. The
answer to this contention lies in the wording of the statute
in which it is provided that the tax does not apply where the
transportation of property is wholly within or between incorporated cities "where ·no porNon of the p~tblie highway
outside the corporate limits of the cities or private property
is traversed in such operation." (Emphasis added.) A majority of this court said in the Bekins case (21 Cal.2d at
pp. 140, 141) that "'fhe preparatory activities sought to be
excepted are just as much a part of and essential to transportation, and therefore to operation of motor vehieles, as are
actual loading and unloading operations whieh are also preparatory to the rolling of the vehicle along the highways. To
adopt the plaintiff's suggestion would be to add to the language of the definition a limitation which the Legislature did
not express and which it must be deemed it did not intend.
If the Legislature intended to exclude from 'operation' as
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defined every ineidrntal
essential in the mattrr of
and hire, it could
havr
such 1imiting 1vords the Lrgislature
of not so limiting or circumscribing the meaning or scope of
the act. (In 1"e Bush, 6 Cal.2d 4-3
P.2d 511].) Under the
applicable rules oi' construction this court may not supply
any language which the Legislature must be deemed to have
omitted intentionally.''
Plaintiff also contends that the Bckins ease was decided on facts occurring prior to the 1939 amendment to the
act which, it is argued, constituted a substantive ehangc in
the law. 'l'his same contention was made with respect to the
1941 codification of what is nmv scctioll 96:33 in San Diego etc.
Ry. Co. v. Stale Board of Equalization (1948), 89 Cal.App.2d
267,270 [200 P.2d 573], where the court said: "\Vc find no
merit in this contention. No change in the language of the
statutes has been mactc which compels such eonelnsion; and
if the Legislature intended, by the slight changes made in
the wording of the law, that in determining gross receipts
subject to taxation, only that portion of a single fare attributable to transportation in unincorporated territory should be
taxed, no reason appears why cryptic language should have
been used. \Vhcrc prorationing has been intended, as provided in section 9606, snpra, the Legislature has so provided
in definite terms; and its failure to provide for the apportionment oi' gross reeeipts from intcr-eity travel on a mih'age
basis, when it specifieally so provided regarding interstate
travel, is convincing evidence that no such result "\Yas intended.
It is beyond the province of conrts to read into seetion 9653,
sttpra, language which, we must assume, was intentionally
omitted. Purthermore, that the~ Legislature did not intend
to provide for prorationing as claimed is indicated by section
9652, supra. Also section 9653 is an exemption statute, and
as such is subjeet to the rule that exemptions from taxation
are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. (Cypress
Lawn Cemetery Assn. Y. San Froncisco, ~11 Cal. 887, 3!30
[295 P. 818] ; Bay Cities Tmnsp. Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cal.2d
706, 712 [68 P.2d 710]; Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432,
441-442 [110 P.2d 419, 184 A.L.R. 1424] ; Robertson v. Johnson, 55 Cal.App.2d 610, 614 [1:n P.2d 388].)" Plaintiff's
argument that the court in the San Diego case was referring
to the 1941 codification, rather than the 1939 amendment, is
without merit. The court was referring specifically to the
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apparont fcon1 its c·otu·lusion
''
our conclusion is that the (keisimm in In rc Bush and Bek'ins
Van
supra, ar(; applicable and eoni rolling
in this ease." The 1941 t•odifieai ion of what is llOW sed ion
9653 divided the scetion into two parts, changed a (:omma to
a
and substituted the word "does" for the phrase
''
hereunder shall.''
It should be noted that while the trial court made findings
which are in accord with the facts heretofore set forth, it
concluded that defendant was not entitled to assess the tax
because it was levied on "gross
from the transportation of goods in operations wholly within the limits of incorporated dties or between incorporated cities where no
portion of the public hig1nvay outside the c-orporate limits
of such eities were trayersed. . . . ''
It appears to us that the wording of the statute is
significant and that the r~egislature undoubtedly intended
that the exemption should apply only where entirely intracity operations were concerned. It, of course, cannot be denied that in the California Motor case the pickup and delivery
service while intracity was incidental to the intercity operations of the plaintiff there as it was in the Bekins case.
There is, of course, in the Dekins case and the one under
consideration an intermingling of operations which was not
present in the California Motor case although the same company conducted both types of operations in all three cases.
In view of the holding in the San Diego case heretofore set
forth which involved intra- and extra-city transportation of
passengers, the amendment to section 9653 by the addition
of subsection (c) in 1955 is interesting. It is there provided
that "If any incorporated city imposes any tax or any franchise or license fee measured by the gross receipts derived
from the transportation of passengers and any operator enaagecl in the transportation of passengers partly within ancl
partly without the city, the tax imposed by this part cloes
not apply to the por·tion of the gross receipts attributable to
operations within the city and inclttclecl in the measure of the
city tax or fee. The amount of gross receipts to which the
tax does not apply under this subdivision shall not exceed the
proportion of the operator's gross receipts that the mileage
operated within the city bears t() the entire mileage over which
the operations extend." (Emphasis added.) By the addition of this subsection the Legislature provided for a prorationing of gross receipts where intra- and extra-city pas-
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senger service was involved. No similar provision has been
enacted to take care of the intra- and extra-city transportation of property. In the absence of such legislation, and
under the section as it now stands, we do not see how intracity operations which are an inseparable part of intercity
can be considered exempt from the gross receipts
tax.
The
is reversed.
Gibson, C.

Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for
the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Patrosso in the opinion
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Santa
Fe Transportation Co. v. State Board of Equalization (Cal.
App.), 328 P.2d 990.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 4,
1959. Shenk, .T., Schauer, .J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[Sac. No. 6819.

In Bank.

Feb. 6, 1959.]

HAROLD L. HOTLE et al., as Executors, etc., Appellants, v.
EVELYN P. lVIILLER, as Special Administrator, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Reformation of Instruments-Pleading.-A complaint by executors of a will alleging that on a designated date testatrix
and her husband opened a joint tenancy bank account, that
on another date more than 12 years later the spouses orally
agreed that, regardless of how title was held, all their property
had been acquired as community property and that "all of
said property, and any and all property which they might
thereafter acquire, should be held and owned by them as community property regardless of the ·way the record title might
stand at any time," that they employed an attorney to draft
the written instrument, which they executed in the mistaken
belief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding, but
McK. Dig. References: [1] Reformation of Instruments, § 35;
[2, 3, 6, 7, 9] Banks, § 85(1); [4] Evidence, § 327; [5] Evidence,
§ 381; [8] Husband and Wife, § 159.

